Once a manufacturing firm has decided to "go international" it must make an important choice regarding the appropriate mode for organizing its foreign business activities. Options include exporting, licensing, franchising, joint ventures, and wholly owned foreign subsidiaries. Each entry mode has different implications for the degree of control a firm can exercise over foreign operations (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Caves, 1982; Root, 1987) , the resources it must commit to the foreign market (Vernon, 1983; Hill, Hwang & Kim, 1990) , the risks it must bear to expand into that market (Hill & Kim, 1988; Hill et al. 1990 ) and the share of "economic rents" the firm can generate and keep for itself (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Hill et al. 1990; Buckley & Casson, 1996) . Furthermore, initial entry mode choices are difficult to change without considerable loss of time and money (Root, 1987) . For these reasons, the entry mode used to penetrate a foreign market can have a profound impact on the success of international operations, even among large multinational corporations (Hill et al. 1990; Root, 1987) . Therefore, entry mode selection is a very important, if not critical, strategic decision for multinational firms (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992) and has been a central issue within the international business literature since Hymer's (1960) groundbreaking dissertation.
A fundamental dimension of the entry mode decision that directly impacts degree of control, resource commitment, risk and "rent sharing" is the extent to which firms collaborate with local firms in the host markets they enter. When collaborating for the purpose of market access, multinational firms may choose to license local firms to provide products, offer international franchises, form strategic alliances, or enter joint ventures with local firms. On the other hand, multinational firms may choose not to engage in ongoing collaboration with outside partners and, therefore, have the internalization options of either producing and marketing products entirely within their own organization structures or producing their products "in house" and then relying on arm's-length transactions to market them.
In recent years, global competition and accelerated technological change have led to such rapid increases in inter-firm marketing partnerships across national borders (Beamish, 1988; Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Hamel, Doz & Prahalad, 1989 ) that some scholars have dramatically labeled this the "age of alliance capitalism" (e.g., Dunning, 1995) . Furthermore, anecdotal and case study evidence has strongly suggested that collaboration with foreign partners may be required for resource-constrained (INVs) (Coviello & Munro, 1992) . Collaboration allows the firm to extend its competitive advantages into more locations (Kogut, 1988; Makino & Delios, 1996) faster and with reduced cost and market uncertainty (Aulakh, Kotabe & Sahay, 1996; Buckley & Casson, 1996; Contractor & Lorange, 1988) .
Furthermore, because resource commitments constitute exit barriers that can limit strategic flexibility (Hill et al. 1990; Harrigan, 1985) , leveraging resources of local partners, rather than committing the firm's own resources for knowledge acquisition, can provide more strategic flexibility under conditions of rapid technological change (Buckley & Casson, 1996) . Therefore, collaboration can allow firms to focus on and invest in a few selected core competencies, leverage the competencies of other firms, and thereby grow into formidable global competitors.
Despite the benefits and increasing popularity of collaboration, empirical evidence indicates a surprisingly high level of managerial dissatisfaction with inter-firm collaboration (e.g., Beamish, 1985 Beamish, , 1988 Tallman & Shenkar, 1994) . Furthermore, decades of empirical research have failed to link various forms of collaboration to objective measures of firm performance. Given these results, researchers studying collaboration appear to have largely abandoned objective measures of performance and have begun to focus on subjective measures including, managers' satisfaction with partnerships (e.g., Harrigan, 1988; Kogut & Zander, 1992) , the accumulation of competencies resulting from collaboration (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1992) , the strategic positions of parent firms of joint ventures (e.g., Doz, 1988) , or stability and duration of collaborative arrangements (e.g., Harrigan, 1988; Kogut, 1988 ).
The subjective measures mentioned above can inform our understanding of large multinational corporations with enough slack resources to afford the luxury of collaborating for "strategic" reasons.
However, new ventures seeking to enter international markets may not have that luxury. New ventures, for which resources are limited and survival is an ever-present issue (Laitenen, 1992) , face far greater pressure to pursue actions that will improve financial performance. Therefore, international new ventures (INVs) represent a particularly interesting sample for studying the elusive relationship between collaboration and performance. The intent of this research is to shed additional light on our currently nascent understanding of the practices of INVs. In addition, given their relatively simple strategies and streamlined structures, the study of INVs may uncover relationships masked within the complex context of large, established multinational firms. As a result, it his hoped that this study will inform future research on multinational firms of all ages and sizes.
Because collaboration results in both advantages and disadvantages, the foundational premise of this paper is that collaboration is efficient or optimal only under the right circumstances (Buckley & Casson, 1996; Tallman & Shenkar, 1994) . In the following section, Transaction Cost theory is presented as a framework for exploring conditions under which collaboration is likely to affect performance in foreign markets. After a general overview of the theory is given, specific research hypotheses will be developed. The paper will then describe the research methods employed in this study and its results. Finally, a discussion of the relevance and importance of the study's findings will be provided.
THEORETIC BACKGROUND
The benefits of collaboration stem from the exchange of knowledge between partners (Lawless & Price, 1992) . When a multinational firm collaborates with a local partner for the sake of entering a foreign market, the local partner provides relevant knowledge about that market. In exchange, the multinational firm provides knowledge about its products, services and practices, and thereby attempts to extend and exploit its competitive advantage within the host country (Dunning, 1988 (Dunning, , 1983 Makino & Delios, 1996) . Consequently, under certain conditions collaboration can reduce the investment required by a multinational firm and the uncertainty of doing business in an unfamiliar environment, while simultaneously leveraging its competitive advantage and allowing it to expand more rapidly and to more locations. Although collaborating offers important benefits to the multinational firm, when examining the performance implications of collaborating, it is necessary to also consider its costs. Transaction Cost (TC) theory (Williamson, 1975 (Williamson, , 1985 provides an excellent lens through which to examine the relative costs and benefits of collaboration and, more importantly, for understanding how those costs and benefits vary depending on the type of the knowledge that is transferred between partners. This theory, frequently called "internalization theory" within the international business literature (Rugman 1981) , has been used extensively to examine the entry mode choices of large multinational firms (e.g., Contractor, 1990; Denekamp, 1995; Hennart, 1988 Hennart, , 1990 Hennart, , 1991 . It has also been advocated as a means of understanding the entry of entrepreneurial firms into foreign markets (Zacharakis, 1998 ), but has not previously been empirically tested using a large sample of INVs.
In general, TC theory argues that both collaboration and internalization involve several specific and substantial transaction costs. When the transactions costs of collaboration are high relative to the transaction costs of internalization, performance advantages are conferred to firms that internalize transfers within their own hierarchical structure (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982) . Logically, the reverse is also true. In other words, the relationship between collaboration and performance is moderated by the transaction costs of collaboration relative to the transaction costs of internalization. Additionally, the transaction costs associated with collaboration are directly related to the type of knowledge that is to be transferred, as well as contextual factors including bounded rationality, and opportunism. These relationships, which constitute the theoretical foundation for this study, are summarized in Figure 1 and will be discussed in greater detail below.
For firms that forgo collaboration, transaction costs associated with internalization can include the costs of additional payroll and overhead; added plant, property and equipment; costs of administration; as well as potential inefficiencies and the opportunity costs associated with having assets committed to internal transactions. Perhaps most relevant for INVs, internalization may cause firms to miss opportunities to move quickly into multiple foreign markets if they lack the resources to do so internally. Thus, it might be said that the benefits of collaboration stem directly from avoiding the costs of internalization. On the other hand, internalization advantages stem directly from avoiding the transaction costs of collaboration. Advantages of internalization include reducing the direct and indirect costs associated with writing, enacting and enforcing contracts with partners. Internalization can also reduce the sometimes substantial costs associated with training partners, technology assistance, management assistance, increased communication complexity, increased conflict, and real or feigned incompetence of partners (Buckley & Casson, 1996; Lyles & Salk, 1996) . However, as explained below, the more important advantages of internalization result from reducing the impact of bounded rationality and opportunism on the transfer of knowledge between partners.
Two basic assumptions upon which TC theory is founded relate directly to the transfer of knowledge to outside partners. One assumption is that people are constrained by bounded rationality: they do not have access to all relevant information nor can they fully comprehend all information that is available to them (Seth & Thomas, 1994; Simon, 1955) . A second assumption is that people are opportunistic: they pursue their own self-interests with guile (Seth & Thomas, 1994; Williamson, 1988) .
Transaction costs associated with collaboration include inefficiencies in the transfer of knowledge, as well as the direct and indirect costs incurred in order to govern exchanges with other organizations such that ill effects of bounded rationality and opportunism are minimized. Therefore, transaction costs of collaboration vary according to the degree that opportunism and bounded rationality impact transfers and they vary based on inherent inefficiencies in the transfer of knowledge. In other words, some forms of knowledge are more difficult to transfer and are more subject to the negative effects of bounded rationality and/or opportunism than others and, therefore, involve higher transaction costs if transferred to outside partners.
Bounded rationality influences the difficulty with which knowledge can be transferred to outside partners. For example, knowledge that is tacit or ill codified is difficult and costly to transmit across organizational boundaries (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Buckley & Casson, 1996) . Such knowledge is also difficult to correctly value and protect via contracts (Teece, 1977; Williamson, 1985) .
Furthermore, external circumstances like uncertainty or asymmetry of information between partners further limit the ability of boundedly rational mangers to write and enforce contracts (Williamson, 1985) .
Opportunism also increases the risks associated with transferring knowledge to outside partners. One of the greatest disadvantages of collaboration is that it increases dissemination risk (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992) . Dissemination risk refers to the risk that firm-specific advantages in know-how will be expropriated by those with whom the firm collaborates (Hill & Kim, 1988) and used for purposes other than those for which they were originally intended. This is extremely important because knowledge often constitutes the competitive advantage of a multinational firm (Casson, 1982; Caves, 1982; Dunning, 1983; Hill et al. 1990 ). In addition to dissemination risk, collaboration brings with it the potential for opportunistic partners to reap short term benefits while substituting lower cost, inferior products, thereby degrading product quality or diluting brand identification (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Caves, 1982; Davidson, 1982; Hennart, 1982; Holton, 1971) . Furthermore, uncertainty makes it more difficult to anticipate and provide contractually for potential contingencies, which makes it more difficult to evaluate the contribution of each partner, thereby increasing the potential for opportunism (Williamson, 1985) .
Transaction costs can affect a firm's bottom line directly as a result of increased expenses incurred for internalization (e.g., administrative costs) or as a result of efforts to control bounded rationality and/or opportunism in the case of collaboration (e.g., legal expenses to write and enforce contracts). However, an understanding of transaction costs can also help explain the firm's top line revenues. Based on TC theory, Anderson & Gatignon (1986) explained that different entry modes have different advantages and disadvantages, and, therefore, entry mode choices involve tradeoffs that should be discussed in terms of relative costs and benefits. Using similar reasoning Hennart (1991) argued that TC theory simultaneously considers both costs (e.g., free riding by partners) and benefits of collaboration (e.g., market penetration), and that entry mode choices depend on both. Likewise, other scholars have argued that the attractiveness of collaboration is a function of both its revenue enhancing and cost reducing (relative to internalization) benefits (Beamish & Banks, 1987; Teece, 1983) . Williamson and Ouchi (1981) explained that viable modes of organization are those that economize on transaction costs. In economic terms, economizing implies optimizing tradeoffs between costs and benefits. further explained that organizational structures are formed as a means of taking advantage of opportunities in the marketplace, and that organizational form has implications for firm performance in terms of goal attainment as well as specific costs incurred.
Applying the same logic to the specific context addressed by this paper, if a firm foregoes collaboration when entering a foreign country and circumstances are such that it would have been more efficient to benefit from an outside partner's expertise, that firm needlessly foregoes the benefits of collaboration (e.g., faster, more efficient market penetration and sales growth) while simultaneously incurring the relatively higher costs of internalization. On the other hand, a firm that collaborates when it would be more optimal not to do so may find its expansion goals frustrated by the uncontrolled (and perhaps uncontrollable) effects of bounded rationality and opportunism, in addition to the direct expenses incurred in futile attempts to combat them. For example, if a firm attempts to communicate knowledge that is difficult or impossible to transfer to an outside partner due to complexity coupled with bounded rationality, sales expected to result from that collaboration may be disappointing or never materialize at all. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, once resources are committed to one entry mode, that decision is difficult and costly to reverse and the firm may incur high opportunity costs as a result of not using resources effectively. However, on the positive side, when a firm employs collaboration under the right circumstances, the benefits of collaboration should outweigh and perhaps even overshadow the transaction costs of collaboration. Likewise, when a firm internalizes transfers under the right conditions, the benefits of internalization should outweigh the associated transaction costs.
Because the transfer of knowledge is at the heart of the costs and benefits costs of collaboration, two specific types of knowledge that might be transferred will be explored more thoroughly at this point. It is generally believed that multinational firms seeking to enter a foreign market must have competitive advantages that allow them to overcome the inherent advantages of indigenous firms with greater knowledge of and easier access to that market (Caves, 1971; Hymer, 1976) . These advantages typically take the form of either technological or marketing expertise (Casson, 1982; Caves, 1982; Dunning, 1983; Hill et al. 1990 ). Furthermore, new ventures are generally required to compete based on innovation-based or marketing-based differentiation because they are unlikely to be able to compete with established competitors on a cost basis (Chaganti, Chaganti & Mahajan, 1989; Porter, 1980) . Consequently, the transfer of these two types of knowledge should be especially important to
INVs. Therefore, the transaction cost implications of transferring technological and marketing advantages will be discussed below.
Technological Advantages
Not surprisingly, evidence from prior research suggests that the competitive advantages of INVs frequently stem from offering innovative, highly differentiated products (Coviello & Munro, 1992; Jolly, Alahunta & Jeannet, 1992; McDougall, 1989; Ray, 1989; Shrader 1996) . In fact, evidence suggests that the reason many INVs seek entry into international markets is to recoup sunk research and development (R&D) expenditures which might be too large to recoup in their home market . R&D intensity is commonly used as a proxy for the firm-specific advantages gained from research and development activities (Denekamp, 1995) .
Furthermore, because technological advantages obsolesce over time, continuous investment in R&D is required to maintain competitive advantage.
Although proprietary knowledge gained from R&D is often an asset of value that can be licensed, franchised, or contributed to a joint venture (Root, 1987) , it is particularly subject to transmission hazards because it is often ill codified (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986) , complex and surrounded with uncertainty. In some cases, this knowledge may be so complex that even the innovator's personnel do not fully understand it (Buckley & Casson, 1996) and, therefore, cannot communicate it to outsider partners. Such technological knowledge is subject to classic problems of valuation: the buyer cannot know what the knowledge is worth unless the knowledge is disclosed, at which point the acquirer need not pay for it (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986) . Furthermore, because innovations resulting from technological investment are shrouded in complexity and uncertainty, the possibility of writing complete contracts to protect this intellectual property is limited, thereby increasing the potential for opportunism. Because of the difficulties in transferring and protecting technological advantages, the direct and indirect costs of doing so will negatively impact the performance of firms that attempt to do so. TC theory suggests that:
Hypothesis 1: Collaboration to enter a foreign market, coupled with high expenditures on R&D, will be negatively related to performance in that market.
Marketing Advantages
In addition to technological advantages, case study evidence suggests that INVs often seek to transfer marketing-based advantages to foreign markets. They frequently attempt to gain market power by pre-empting competitors into foreign markets, establishing their products as industry standards, and aggressively creating brand loyalty before competitors arrive (Coviello & Munro, 1992; Jolly et al. 1992; Oviatt & McDougall, 1995) . Advertising expenditures generate firm-specific assets in the form of brand recognition and product differentiation (Denekamp, 1995) . Like, technological advantages, these advantages obsolesce over time, requiring continuous reinvestment in advertising.
For multinational firms, the ability to transfer marketing-based differentiation generally requires a high level of knowledge about local customers' demands and tastes (Hymer, 1976; Kogut, 1988) . This is the sort of knowledge that local partners are well suited to provide. Furthermore, the proliferation of international licensing agreements and international franchises indicates that brand name, image, and other marketing advantages can be efficiently transferred to foreign partners. However, because a firm's image and reputation are transferred to the firm's partners, collaborating to transfer marketingbased advantages also involves transaction costs. Outside partners can benefit from the reputation of the multinational firm while substituting inferior products at lower cost. In this way, "free riders" can opportunistically benefit temporarily from debasement of the product (Caves, 1982; Hennart, 1991) .
As a result, the multinational firm's brand name is degraded (Davidson, 1982) and their international position is diluted or confused as a result of inconsistencies (Caves, 1982; Holton, 1971) . Although the negative impact of free riding is costly to the multinational firm, this behavior ultimately has serious longrun implications for the local partner as well. Thus, true self-interest should actually impede such behavior. Free riding, by definition, implies collaborating with partners who are unscrupulous, incompetent, or, at best, myopic. This implies that the disadvantages of free riding can be almost entirely mitigated by selecting appropriate partners. Prior research indicates INV managers rely heavily on partners from personal networks, with whom trust is established (Brush, 1992; Coviello & Munro, 1992; Jolly et al. 1992; McDougall, Shane & Oviatt 1994; Ray, 1989) , thereby limiting potential free rider effects. Furthermore, contractual mechanisms are well suited to protect against free-rider costs because quality standards can often be almost entirely specified in contracts.
Because INVs tend to use global marketing strategies to target market niches that are inherently international and fairly homogeneous worldwide (Coviello & Munro, 1992; Jolly et al. 1992; Ray, 1989) , transaction costs resulting from environmental complexity (and the bounded rationality that makes complexity problematic) are reduced. For example, if "yuppies are yuppies are yuppies", whether they reside in the U.S., Italy or Saudi Arabia, then a firm targeting this niche should experience relatively little increased complexity when crossing international boarders.
Because the transaction costs associated with transferring marketing advantages are relatively low or easily overcome and marketing advantages stem from high advertising expenditures:
Hypothesis 2: Collaboration to enter a foreign market, coupled with high expenditures on advertising will be positively related to performance in that market.
Use of Collaboration
If we believe that managers are rational decision makers (even if that rationality is bounded) who attempt to maximize performance (Simon, 1978) it is reasonable to assume that they are aware of the transaction costs associated with collaboration as well as its benefits, and that their decisions regarding whether or not to collaborate will take these factors into consideration, as argued by Tallman and Shenkar (1994) . Thus, given the implications of TC theory and the previous hypotheses, we might expect that managers will be less likely to collaborate to transfer technological advantages and more likely to do so to transfer marketing advantages.
Although prior research has produced mixed results regarding the relationship between advertising expenditures and entry mode choices (Denekamp, 1995) strong evidence suggests a negative relationship between R&D expenditures and collaboration. Research indicates that firms with highest R&D expenditures are more likely to forgo collaboration and internalize operations (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Caves, 1982; Davidson & McFetridge, 1985; Stopford & Wells, 1972) and radical new products are more likely to be transferred internally than to independent firms (Davidson & McFetridge, 1985) . Furthermore, older technologies are more likely to be transferred via licensing or joint ventures because transfer costs decrease for mature products classes where knowledge becomes more codified and widely available for hire (Teece, 1976; Williamson, 1985) . Therefore, based on TC theory and prior evidence: This sampling technique resulted in a final sample of 70 high technology manufacturing firms that entered foreign markets as new ventures. All were single businesses operating in one of 9 industries, with international sales averaging 32 percent of total sales (ranging from 5% to 87%). They made 176 foreign market entries into countries throughout the world and used a variety of operating modes.
Because the focus of this research was on the entry mode used to gain access to each market, the appropriate unit of analysis was the individual foreign market entry. Therefore, the effective sample size for analyses was 176.
Although the sample used for all statistical analyses was the 176 foreign entries, it is also informative to note how the use of collaborative entry modes relates to the 70 firms studied. Among these 70 international new ventures, 20 collaborated with foreign partners in order to enter foreign markets and 50 did not. Among the 20 firms that collaborated, 11 entered only one foreign market and used collaboration; three entered two foreign markets and used collaboration in each; and six entered between two and four foreign markets using a mixture of collaboration and non-collaboration.
Data
Where appropriate, all data except performance data were collected for the sixth year of each individual firm's operation. This provided a snapshot of the level of foreign market activity each firm was able to achieve while still a new venture and controlled for the impact of firm age on international activities. Performance data were collected for years five, six, seven and eight of each individual firm's operation. Data on foreign sales, specific countries entered, and entry modes were collected from the firms' annual reports. For ventures whose annual reports were not detailed enough, their chief financial officers were interviewed by phone to complete this information. Number of employees, firm sales, R&D expense and advertising expense were collected from Compustat PC+. Details on how each variable was measured are discussed below.
Measures
Collaboration. Entry modes were initially classified as exporting, licensing, operation of foreign sales offices, joint venturing, or operation of wholly owned subsidiaries (none of the firms in this sample used franchising). Of the 176 foreign market entries, 25 involved licensing or joint venturing, which required collaboration with outsiders. The remaining 151 entries were via exporting, foreign sales offices, or wholly owned subsidiaries, which did not involve collaboration. A dummy variable was created for each firm and was coded 1 if it used an entry mode involving collaboration or 0 otherwise.
Performance. While numerous objective measures of firm performance exist, profitability and sales growth are arguably two of the most relevant for this study. As explained in the theory section, transaction costs have direct implication for both profitability and sales growth. Furthermore, previous research had indicated that the primary reason young firms internationalize is to pursue growth opportunities (Brush, 1992; Oviatt & McDougall, 1995) , and that they often collaborate for the sake of doing so (Coviello & Munro, 1992; McDougall et al. 1994) . Therefore, it would be expected that collaboration should influence sales growth. In addition, all the firms in this sample were publicly traded and would, therefore, face pressure to pursue strategies (including, perhaps internationalization and collaboration) that would enhance profitability. Consequently two measures of performance were examined: profitability and sales growth.
Profitability was measured as the average return on sales (ROS) within each foreign market during years 6, 7 and 8 of each firm's existence. For each entry, data were collected from Compustat PC+ and the firm's annual report regarding profit generated from that market and sales there.
Sales growth in each foreign market was calculated on an annual basis from year 5 to year 8 of each firm's existence. These measures were adjusted by subtracting the industry average growth rate during the same time period. Finally, results for the three time periods were averaged to calculate the variable "Sales Growth in Each Foreign Market." The specific formula used for each year's growth was as follows: Sales Growth=((FMS yi -FMS yi-1 )/FMS yi-1 )-((IS yi -IS yi-1 )/IS yi-1 ) where
FMS=foreign market sales, IS=industry sales, and yi=year 6, 7 or 8. Industry sales data was gathered from Ward's Directory of U.S. Private and Public Firms (1983-1992) . Data for all growth measures used in this study were examined with box plots, normal probability plots and univariate procedures to determine whether outliers or skewness might affect the results. No problems were indicated and no variable transformations were used. These measures included "Sales Growth in Each Foreign Market,"
"Firm Overall Sales Growth," and "Foreign Market Growth."
R&D Intensity. For each firm, R&D intensity was measured by computing the ratio of R&D expenses to sales. The resulting quotient was then adjusted for industry effects by subtracting the industry average R&D intensity. Industry average data were collected from aggregate data provided on Compustat PC+ for each firm's 4-digit primary SIC code. Advertising Intensity. For each firm, advertising intensity was measured by computing the ratio of advertising expenses to sales. The resulting quotient was then adjusted for industry effects by subtracting the industry average advertising intensity.
Industry average data were collected from aggregate date provided on Compustat PC+ for each firm's 4-digit primary SIC code.
Control Variables
Foreign market growth. Given the "inequality of opportunity" offered by foreign markets with varying economic conditions, firms entering more attractive markets should have performance advantages over those entering less attractive markets. Furthermore, because INVs enter foreign markets that offer opportunities for growth (Coviello & Munro, 1992; , the influence of foreign market growth should be controlled when examining performance. For each country entered, foreign market growth was measured as the average growth in that country's gross national product (GDP) during the five years preceding the year in which firm internationalization was measured. GDP data were collected from archival sources provided by the U.S. Commerce Department.
Firm age at foreign entry. Firm performance was measured consistently in years 5, 6, 7 and 8 of each firm's existence. However, at that point in their organizational histories the firms had been involved in the foreign markets for varying amounts of time. Thus, it was necessary to control for the number of years each firm had been in each market. Data regarding the age of each firm at the time of each foreign market entry were collected from its annual reports for the first six years of its existence.
Firm level sales growth. Given the emphasis of INVs on sales growth , and the need to control for differences in firm performance that could partially explain performance differences in various markets, it was necessary to control for sales growth at the firm level. The firm level sales growth of each firm was calculated each year with the formula Sales Growth=(Sales yi -Sales yi-1 )/Sales yi-1 where yi=year 6, 7 or 8. The resulting figures were then adjusted by subtracting average industry sales growth during the same time period and averaged. All sales data were collected from Compustat PC+.
Firm size. Firm size reflects the ability of the firm to absorb costs associated with various entry modes (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Buckley & Casson, 1976) . In the context of this study, the more limited resources available to smaller firms may increase their reliance on collaboration (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Coviello & Munro, 1992; Hennart, 1991; McDougall et al. 1994; . Furthermore, prior research indicates that even among a relatively homogeneous group of new ventures, firm size influenced the resources available to them, the strategies they pursued, and their performance (Shrader & Simon, 1997) . Therefore, it is important to include firm size in the study of collaboration and performance. The number of people employed in year six indicated firm size (collected from Compustat PC+). In order to control for the potential diminishing impact of firm size, the log transformation of the number of employees was used in analyses.
Market share objectives. Firms often internationalize for the specific purpose of increasing market share (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992) and firms with aggressive market share objectives are more likely to collaborate as a means of accomplishing that objective (Buckley & Casson, 1996; Contractor & Lorange, 1988) . Prior research indicates that this motivation and approach are particularly true for INVs (Brush, 1992; McDougall, 1989; .
Furthermore, high aspirations have been linked to increased organizational risk taking (e.g., Bromiley, 1991; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1986) , suggesting that firms with ambitious market share objectives may be more likely to tolerate dissemination risk, free rider potential and other risks associated with collaboration. According to the behavioral theory of the firm, organizations with higher aspirations are more aggressive in seeking ways to improve firm performance (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Shapira, 1987) . Given these considerations, it was important to also control for differences in firms' market share objectives in this study. The market share objective of each firm was measured by averaging the responses of two researchers who independently content analyzed the venture's IPO prospectus and indicated on a five point scale whether the firms market share objective was to become a minor player, average player, major player, segment leader or industry leader (inter-rater reliability = .81). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and variable correlations. No correlation was greater than .42 and only 12 of the 45 correlations were significant (p<.05). Therefore, multicollinearity among these independent variables did not present a problem in statistical analyses.
RESULTS

-----------------------Insert Table 1 about here ------------------------Performance Results
Following the procedure outlined by Sharma and his colleagues (Sharma, Durand & Gur-Arie, 1981) , moderated multiple regression was used to examine the relationship between collaboration and performance and moderating influences on that relationship. This procedure has been shown to be more powerful than the alternative of analyzing sub-group correlation coefficients (Stone-Romero & Anderson, 1994) , because it utilizes data more completely (Sharma, Durand and Gur-Arie, 1981) . For each performance variable, four regression equations were tested. The first contained only the control variables. The collaboration variable was introduced in the second. R&D intensity, advertising intensity, and foreign market growth were added to the third to examine their main effects. Interaction terms were introduced in the fourth model. In order to conclude with this analysis that a particular independent variable was a pure moderator, its main effects would not be significant, but the corresponding interaction term would be. If results indicated both the main effect and interaction term were significant, this would indicate that the variable is a quasi moderator. If results indicated that the main effect was significant, but the interaction term was not, it would indicate that the variable was simply an independent predictor variable, not a moderator (Sharma, et al. 1981) . Results of these tests are presented in Tables 2 and 3. - Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here -----------------------Profitability. As shown in Table 2 , all four models were highly significant predictors of profitability (p<.001 for each model). Also in all four models profitability was positively related to overall sales growth of the firm (p<.001 for each model), negatively related to firm size (p<.001 for each model), negatively related to market share objective (p<.01, p<.01, p<.01, p<.05 respectively).
----------------------
In models 3 and 4 profitability was negatively related to firm age at the time of the foreign entry (p<.01 in each case). Model 1 was the base model and included only the control variables. In model 2, collaboration was introduced. The collaboration variable was not significant, and no additional variance was explained by adding the variable (adjusted R 2 went from .32 to .31). These results indicated that without considering other variables, there was no direct relationship between collaboration and profitability. In model 3, the study variables (R&D intensity and advertising intensity) were added. The results were significant (F=26.39; p<.001) and indicated a positive main effect for R&D intensity (p<.01) as well as a negative main effect for advertising intensity (p<.001). That is, among the entire sample of INVs (including collaborators and non-collaborators) profitability was positively associated with high R&D expenditures and negatively associated with high advertising expenditures.
Model 4 was the full model, including interactions of the study variables with collaboration. The model was significant (F=24.31; p<.001) and represented a significant improvement over the third model as indicated by a change in adjusted R 2 from .58 to .64 (p<.001). In model 4, R&D intensity had a positive direct relationship to profitability (p<.05); however, the interaction of R&D intensity with collaboration was negatively related to profitability (p<.001). These results indicated that R&D intensity was a quasi-moderator and provided support for hypothesis 1. Advertising intensity had a negative direct relationship with profitability (p<.001); however the interaction of advertising intensity with collaboration was positively related to profitability (p<.05) These results indicated that advertising intensity was a quasi-moderator and provided support for hypothesis 2.
Sales Growth. As shown in Table 3 , all four models were highly significant predictors of sales growth (p<.001 for each model). In all four models sales growth in each foreign market was positively related to economic growth in that market growth (p<.05, p<.05, p<.01, p<.01 respectively) and negatively related to the overall sales growth of the firm (p<.001, p<.001, p<.01, p<.05 respectively).
In models 1 and 2 firm size was positively related to sales growth (p<.01 in each case). Model 1 was the base model and included only the control variables. In model 2, collaboration was introduced. The collaboration variable was not significant, and no additional variance was explained by adding the variable (adjusted R 2 for each model was .16). These results indicated that without considering other variables, there was no direct relationship between collaboration and sales growth. In model 3, the study variables (R&D intensity and advertising intensity) were added. The results were significant (F=7.42; p<.001) and indicated a positive main effect for R&D intensity (p<.001). That is, among the entire sample of INVs (including collaborators and non-collaborators) high R&D expenditures were positively associated with sales growth.
Model 4 was the full model, including interactions of the study variables with collaboration. The model was significant (F=8.25; p<.001) and represented a significant improvement over the third model as indicated by a change in adjusted R 2 from .26 to .37 (p<.001). In model 4, R&D intensity had a positive direct relationship to sales growth (p<.001); however, the interaction of R&D intensity with collaboration was negatively related to sales growth (p<.001). These results indicated that R&D intensity was a quasi-moderator and provided evidence to support hypothesis 1. The interaction of advertising intensity with collaboration was significantly positive (p<.05) with no indication of a main effect, thus indicating a pure moderator and supporting hypothesis 2.
In addition to the tests reported above, additional tests were conducted to improve confidence that these results were not spuriously produced by multicollinearity among independent variables. Given the potential for the R&D intensity and advertising intensity variables to be highly correlated with the interaction terms calculated by multiplying these variables with the collaboration variable (Cortina, 1993; Venkatraman, 1989) , these correlations were examined. The correlation between R&D intensity and its corresponding interaction term was only .01 (not significant). The correlation between advertising intensity and its corresponding interaction term was .26 (p<.001). Therefore, multicollinearity among these variables did not appear to present problems in statistical analyses. Because the correlation between the two interaction terms (i.e., R&D intensity * collaboration and advertising intensity * collaboration) was .50 (p<.001) tests similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3 were conducted with the interaction terms entered separately in Model 4 for each dependent variable. Results of these tests were virtually identical to those reported in Tables 2 and 3 . All of the models were highly significant (p<.001) and in every case the introduction of the interaction term resulted in a significant improvement in explanatory power over models including only control variables and main effects (Model 3 in Tables   2 and 3) . Specifically, introducing R&D intensity separately into the model explaining ROS resulted in an R 2 increase of .04 and introducing advertising intensity separately resulted in an R 2 increase of .02.
Introducing R&D intensity into the model explaining Sales Growth resulted in an R 2 increase of .06 and introducing advertising intensity resulted in an R 2 increase of .02 (p<.001 in all cases).
Factors Related to Collaboration
Logistic regression was used to explore relationships between the study variables and collaboration. This procedure is appropriate for analyzing influences on a dichotomous independent variable and its results are straightforward and easy to interpret (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1992) . Logistic regression is preferred over discriminant analysis because, unlike discriminant analysis, this technique does not rely on strict assumptions of multivariate normality and results are not affected by differences in sub-sample sizes (Hair et al. 1992) . Logistic regression estimates the dependent variable using a log-linear transformation of that dependent variable. In doing so, it estimates an s-shaped dependent variable bounded by the values of 0 and 1, rather than an unbounded linear variable. Such estimates provide a much better fit when the dependent variable is a dummy variable coded as 0 or 1.
The beta coefficients provided by this procedure give the change in the logarithmic odds of obtaining the outcome variable when there is a change of one unit in the predictor variable. If the beta for a variable is significant and positive, then the variable increases the odds of the outcome. If significant and negative, then odds of the outcome are decreased (Dickson & Weaver, 1997 ). Table 4 about here ----------------------- Table 4 presents the results of logistic regression. Model 1 was the base model and included only the control variables. R&D intensity and advertising intensity were added to model 2. Both models were significant (chi squares=22.02 and 31.11, respectively; p<.001). Model 2 represents an improvement over model 1, as indicated by the increase in pseudo adjusted R 2 from .08 to .18.
Results of model 2 indicated that collaboration was positively related to foreign market growth, firm size, and market share objective (p<.05, p<.01 and p<.001 respectively). Collaboration was negatively related to the overall sales growth of the firm (p<.01). However, R&D intensity and advertising intensity were not related to collaboration among this sample. Thus, results provided no support for hypothesis 3 or hypothesis 4.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The results of this study are strong and provide a number of interesting insights into relationships between collaboration and performance. Consistent with previous research, there was no direct relationship between collaboration and performance. However, the study provided strong evidence that the key to understanding how collaboration affects performance is to examine other factors that moderate the relationship. Using TC theory as a framework, results of this study (Tables 2 and 3) were robust with respect to two different objective measures of firm performance and indicated that R&D intensity and advertising intensity moderated the relationship between collaboration and performance.
Because the positive impact of some moderators appears to mask the negative impact of others, the overall relationship between collaboration and performance was not significant.
As expected, the interaction of collaboration and R&D intensity was strongly negatively related to performance. What this means is that firms that spent heavily on R&D and collaborated had significantly lower performance. Interestingly, among all the firms in the sample, R&D intensity was positively associated with performance in foreign markets. This indicated that the relationship between R&D and performance among non-collaborators was strong enough to more than compensate statistically for negative relationship among collaborators. This provided additional evidence of an internalization advantage for transferring technological advantages. TC theory argues that technological advantages are difficult and costly to transfer to external partners, thus, firms that invest heavily in technology should avoid using collaboration as a means of transferring technological knowledge. While technological investments did lead to higher performance, collaborating did not further enhance performance. Instead collaborating suppressed performance. Given these results, it appears that multinational firms concerned with exploiting technological advantages internationally might be better served by internalizing transfers.
Although firms that invested heavily in advertising were no more likely to collaborate (Table 4) , high advertising intensity among collaborators was negatively related to profitability and positively related to sales growth in each foreign market (Tables 2 and 3 ). Consistent with TC theory, it appears that marketing advantages can be more efficiently transferred from INVs to foreign partners. Marketing advantages are, perhaps, less complex than technological advantages and appear to be subject to fewer and more manageable transaction costs when transferred to partners. This supports the belief that firms seeking to differentiate themselves through high levels of advertising can benefit by accessing the intensive local knowledge of local partners.
As a whole, these results support the foundational premise of this paper: collaboration provides advantages and disadvantages and is, therefore, optimal only under the right circumstances. Because transaction costs vary depending on the type of knowledge that is to be transferred to partners, the type of knowledge that is to be transferred is one key to understanding how collaboration relates to performance. Also as expected, results indicated that costs should be considered relative to benefits.
Results presented in Table 4 (Coviello & Munro, 1992; Zacharakis, 1998) . These results are also consistent with prior empirical studies that have led researchers to conclude that managers do not consciously weigh and attempt to optimize the costs and benefits of entry mode choices they make (Tallman & Shenkar, 1994) . Furthermore, prior research indicates that, given biases and heuristics, entrepreneurs focus on the potential returns of strategic decisions and downplay any potential negative consequences (Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Simon, Houghton & Aquino, 2000) .
This implies that they are more likely to focus on the benefits of collaboration than the costs. Therefore, while these results may not reflect the predictions of TC theory, they may indeed reflect reality. If future research provides similar results, the inconsistency between performance implications and actions suggests information that will benefit decision-makers.
As discussed in the introduction, entry mode choices can profoundly influence the long-term performance of multinational firms and initial choices are difficult and costly to change. Therefore, it is important to more fully understand conditions under which entry modes are optimal. In their rush to grow and to achieve an international presence, managers of some INVs appear to collaborate when it is not optimal to do so. It is interesting to note however that not all INVs collaborated. In fact, only about 1/3 of the firms in this sample did and only about 14% of the entries involved collaboration.
While previous research has indicated that collaboration may be a requirement for INVs , many of the firms in this sample may have obtained enough resources from their IPOs to make collaboration less of an imperative.
The sample used for this study provided some distinct advantages. It informs our understanding of the collaborative behaviors of INVs. Perhaps more importantly, though, a sample of young, relatively small firms uncovered relationships that may, indeed, be masked within large, diversified, established firms. Given these benefits, perhaps some of the most fruitful future opportunities for international business research may lie in continued research on INVs.
Sampling IPO firms provided the opportunity to study a large sample of firms over a relatively extended period of time for which extensive data were readily available and which had been objectively evaluated and judged to have the potential to perform well. However the most obvious drawback to using this sample of firms is that it raises questions about the generalizability of these findings. Although results of this study were statistically significant, results might be even stronger if a more random sample were used of the entire population of INVs with a broader range of performance. In addition to a restricted range of performance, IPO firms obviously have far greater financial resources and more legitimacy than the average new venture, which could affect their propensities to internationalize and to collaborate, as well as the quality of foreign partners they choose and their ability to limit certain transaction costs associated with collaborating. Therefore, additional research is needed to determine whether the results found here hold in a more random sample of new ventures, and whether similar insights can be found regarding larger, established multinational firms.
While the ability to collect archival data was a benefit of this study, it also represents a major limitation. Future research is needed to examine details implied by the results of this study. For example, reasonable assumptions were made that firms investing heavily in R&D and/or advertising were creating advantages in firm-specific knowledge. Research using first hand knowledge can shed light on the specific type of advantages INVs seek to transfer to foreign markets. Differences between product and process technologies should be examined. Differences related to the degree of innovation (i.e., incremental or radical) should be examined. Additional research should test a more comprehensive list of competitive strategies that might be used to gain competitive advantage in foreign markets (e.g., localization). Richer data might shed additional light on the importance of networks and trust in counteracting transaction costs, as well as specific details regarding "rent sharing" agreements between partners. Finally, overall results indicated that many firms in this sample did not act "rationally" as predicted by theory or as indicated by the performance results. This raises questions for future research to examine decision-making processes as well as political, cultural, structural or other institutional influences on the decision to collaborate or not.
This study makes a solid contribution to the international business literature by providing evidence of a strong collaboration-performance relationship. Even more importantly, it demonstrates that the collaboration-performance relationship is moderated by other factors. In so doing, it provides evidence to support TC theory and lays the groundwork for future research to determine if these same relationships hold in other contexts. .10 a n=176 b Pseudo adjusted R 2 s were calculated for each model using the formula: Adjusted R 2 =(model chisquare-2p)/(-2L(o)), where p was the number of independent variables (excluding the intercept) in the model and L(o) was the maximum log-likelihood with only the intercept in the model (SAS Institute, 1986 p. 271 
